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The purpose of this research is to analyze the direct impact of corporate governance on intellectual capital 
and firm value and the intellectual capital as the mediating variable between corporate governance and firm 
value. Data technique analysis will be run in WarpPLS software. The findings support all the proposed 
hypothesis, that corporate governance in both Indonesia and Malaysia have a positive significant impact on 
intellectual capital and value. In both countries, intellectual capital also has a positive significant impact. 
However, the main driver of significance on intellectual capital is different. Furthermore, intellectual capital in 
Malaysia is successfully mediate the relationship between corporate governance and firm value. 
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1. Introduction 
On 2015, ASEAN was achieving a major milestone by the establishment of ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) that promotes free movement of goods, services, investments, skilled labor, and 
the free flow of capital1. Every company in ASEAN has to prepare themselves to be ready in facing 
the new economic culture. From the economic perspective, corporate governance is crucial in 
achieving an efficiency of the movement scarce funds to investment project with the highest return2.  
As the increase of attractiveness of corporate governance for Asian countries, the researchers can 
categorize corporate governance into two mechanisms; internal mechanism and external mechanism. 
Because of the availability of data and the most corporate governance research conducted on internal 
mechanism, this study will focus on internal corporate governance mechanisms (gender diversity, 
board size & managerial ownership). Knowledge-based economy, which is known as intellectual 
capital (IC), is also increasingly being recognized as an important strategic resource for the operation 
of organizations3. IC management can transform various intangible resources to create or maximize 
companies’ value4.  As mentioned above that intellectual capital can create value added for the 
company, then intellectual capital can increase investor confidence5.  
The result of an investigation on ASEAN-related to corporate governance, intellectual capital, 
and firm value are varied, depend on the industry, macroeconomic factor (country), type of company 
and the indicator used6. In creating the more meaningful result, there is a suggestion to make a 
comparative analysis between two countries7. The first country chosen as the object of this study is 
Indonesia, where this study is conducted. Malaysia showed the highest score for their effectiveness 
and efficiency of corporate governance practice compared to other most hit countries by the financial 
crisis8. Even though Malaysia seems to have a better corporate governance practice compared to 
Indonesia, both are quite similar in some ways; geographical proximity and cultural similarities9, 10 
and the companies are still dominated by family control – conglomerates11. Thus, Malaysia is chosen 
as the comparison country. 
 
2. Corporate Governance in Indonesia & Malaysia 
Since Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998, Indonesia and Malaysia government pushed more 
effort to establish good corporate governance code. Even more, Malaysia has advanced their corporate 
governance regulatory before financial crisis12. Indonesia’s corporate governance motivate on the 
ethical driven and regulatory driven. The latest good corporate governance support the ethical driven 
motivation in creating checks and balance to support the transparency, accountability and the 
realization of responsibility to ensure company’s performance13. While Malaysia’s corporate 
governance code sets out the principles and the best practices to an optimal governance framework. 
The latest revision of code is more focus on strength of BOD, audit committee and internal audit 
function, aim to encourages progression and provide greater utility for companies and their 
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stakeholders14. Both Indonesia and Malaysia rule companies to decide their own number of board size. 
Both are agree to the flexible number, which is adjusted on company needs to work as a team 
effectively and efficiently14.  
 
3. Corporate Governance Indicators 
Based on the survey conducted by PWC5, other than the expertise of board member, the 
proportion of women of the board is the important aspect for investors. Besides that, increasing number 
of the member with specific expertise are also important. Thus, board size and gender diversity are 
chosen as the indicator of corporate governance. Because this study will be conducted in Indonesia 
and Malaysia, where many researches mentioned that both of them characterize with their 
concentration of ownership15, then managerial ownership is chosen as the last indicator used. 
The optimum board, which should consist of executive and non-executive directors, is important 
for governing the company2. The larger board can promote a higher range of diversity, which is 
believed can deliver more benefits to organizations, because the company can increase the expertise 
needed. However, uncontrolled the larger board may also bring ineffective controls, poor 
communication, and coordination which can decrease the value of the benefit received3. According to 
agency theory, the larger board can contribute to the firm valuation, because the larger board can 
increase the monitoring role of the agency problem. According to resource dependence theory, larger 
board can promote diversity and expertise of pool, ideas, and skills, as well as greater opportunity to 
secure critical resources16. Board size, is defined as the total number of directors on board3, 2, 17. 
Female directors are believed to be much more likely to improve company performance and board 
effectiveness17. Based on agency theory, women can bring positive impact because of their 
consideration. Women consideration on board might be more activist board because outside directors 
could be more considerate18. Based on human capital theory, diverse people in the board of director 
can bring the uniqueness of human capital resources19. The gender diversity is defined as the 
proportion of women on the management board16. 
Ownership structure is usually considered as on of the core internal mechanism of corporate 
governance. Most of the firms tend to view management incentive plans as an effective way of 
reducing agency problem. The separation of ownership could generate a conflict of agency between 
two parties. Especially when the manager place personal interest ahead of shareholder’s interest In 
addressing the agency problem, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested the increasing managerial or 
insider ownership20. Instead of the incentives in maximizing shareholder’s value, managerial 
ownership can also increase their influences in the decision-making of firms general policies21. 
Managerial ownership is defined as the percentage of executive director’s shareholding, direct and 
indirect7. 
 
4. Firm Value 
In line with the increasing market competitiveness, company manager aims to maximize company 
value. As the firm value can contribute to the long-term growth of the company, many researchers 
have conducted a lot of investigation between companies’ attributes and firm value. The most 
valuation used as the calculation is the proxy of Tobin’s Q7, 8, 16. The higher value of TBQ shows the 
higher value of the company8. The formula to calculate Tobin’s Q (TBQ) = (MVE + PS + Debts) / 
TA. Where: MVE = Market Value of Equity (Closing Price of Stock at the end of the year x Number 
of Outstanding Shares); PS = Preferred Stocks; Debt = Short-Term Debt; TA = Book Value of Total 
Assets. 
Corporate governance, which indicated by board size, gender diversity and managerial ownership 
showed a positive significant impact on firm value13, 16, 17, 22. Thus the proposed hypothesis is H1: 
Corporate Governance has a positive impact on the firm value. 
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5. Intellectual Capital (Value Added Intellectual Capital) 
There are a lot of intellectual capital measurement method. The most popular method is VAICTM, 
developed by Pulic. This method is widely used by researchers to measure intellectual capital in 
relation to corporate governance3, 23, 24. VAICTM links between the activities of the company, the 
resources used and the financial outcomes. This measurement is considered to be the universal 
indicator which can show the abilities of companies in value creation and represent a measure of 
business efficiency in knowledge-based economy12. The value added (VA) of intellectual capital as 
the difference between output and inputs. Output is the total sales; Input is the cost of brought in 
material, components and services. VA = OP + DC + EC + D + A. VAICTM is sum into three separate 
indicators; Human Capital Efficiency (HCE), Structural Capital Efficiency (SCE) and Capital 
Employed Efficiency (CEE).  The HCE and SCE constitute IC efficiency (ICE).  HCE = VA/HC. HC 
as the total salaries and wages duties for companies; the lower VA and higher HC means that human 
capital is utilized efficiently. As the increasing both corporate governance and intellectual capital, both 
is believed to have the relation in order to enhance company’s value. More researches also show a 
positive relationship between some indicators of corporate governance and intellectual capital20, 21. 
Thus, the proposed hypothesis is H2: Corporate Governance has a positive impact on the 
intellectual capital.  
Intellectual capital management is one of the resources, which is about managing and 
transforming resources in creating company value4. Intellectual Capital also can be an instrument to 
observe organizational hidden value15. Several researchers concluded a positive relationship between 
VAIC and Tobin’s Q8, 23, 24. The last proposed hypothesis is H3: Intellectual Capital has a positive 
impact on firm value. 
 
6. Research Methodology 
This research conducts an analysis of independent variable, mediating variable and dependent 
variable. Corporate Governance, whose indicators are board-size, gender diversity and managerial 
ownership as independent variable. Intellectual capital as mediating variable. Firm value as dependent 
variable. All data used in this study is a secondary data derived from annual reports, Bloomberg and 
Yahoo Finance. This study will be tested only on consumer goods companies on Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) and Bursa Malaysia from 2010 to 2015. The final sample that met all the criteria is 
25 Indonesia companies (150 firm-year) and 106 Malaysia companies (636 firm-year). 
The detail descriptive analysis of each indicator can be seen on Table 1. Indonesia data showed 
that all indices have passed all the criteria. APC, ARS and AARS, for both Indonesia and Malaysia, 
have P value < 0.001. AVIF and AFVIF have ideal criteria. Tenenhaus GoF of Indonesia and Malaysia 
are considered as medium. SPR and RSCR are on ideal criteria, which the value are 1. Both of SSR 
and NLBCDR have indices value of 1.which are acceptable with the indices above 0.7. In summary, 
the data of Malaysia and Indonesia companies passed all the indices. 
 
7. Research Result and Analysis 
The data gathered from Indonesia and Malaysia showed that Indonesia data is more superior 
compared to Malaysia data. This event may due to the economic condition in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Indonesia’s real GDP growth was higher than Malaysia since 201024. In both Indonesia and Malaysia, 
all indicators of corporate governance have a positive and significant impact on firm value. Thus, 
hypothesis 1 is accepted. Gender diversity in the board becomes increasingly important by adding 
some value added within the companies. The importance of gender diversity is supported by human 
capital theory18, agency theory19, stewardship theory22, competence-based theory and resource 
dependency theory25. The current fact on Indonesia and Malaysia demographic and the represented of 
women on board also agree on the importance of gender diversity on the board. The increasing 
percentage of women on board in Indonesia26 and the development of Women Director’s Registry27 
support the positive impact of women on board. 
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Board size is mentioned as the most important indicator of corporate governance in Indonesia and 
Malaysia. According to agency theory in Jensen and Meckling (1976), the corporate member should 
provide an expert advice, supervise or monitoring role to other members and seek discipline from 
management to ensure that all managers pursue the interest of shareholders. According to resource 
dependence theory, having larger board member means can diverse the member in experiences, ideas, 
and skills as well as greater opportunity to secure critical resources, contact and contracts6. All sample 
companies used in this study are limited liability companies, which are big and have higher 
complexity. Higher complexity can mean the higher diversification, larger assets and more relying on 
debt financing. Thus, the context of Indonesia with larger board size, it is expected that board of 
commissioners has more member with specific experiences and expertise in order to increase the 
quality of advice and their monitoring role on the board of directors. The larger board directors itself 
is expected to increase the capabilities in dealing with business complexity and undertake various 
strategic actions. In Malaysia, a company with unitary board system, larger board can be interpreted 
as companies have bigger outsider companies, thus can increase the pooling of expertize and 
experiences to monitor the managers in day-to-day activities16. 
The managerial ownership significantly positive affect firm value of the companies. According 
to agency theory, ownership structure within the companies can lead in solving the separation of 
ownership and issues in who should be in control14. According to stewardship theory, there are 
situational and psychological factors that incline individuals’ decision to be steward or agents. 
Through the rational process, the agents as individuals have capability to learn and change their 
preferences as they interact throughout time16. 
The result of hypothesis 3 test, both in Malaysia and Indonesia, is accepted. The result is supported 
by the economic condition currently in ASEAN. By maximizing the intellectual capital, companies 
can maximize the exploitation of available resources more effectively and efficiently, especially in the 
knowledge-based economy nowadays8. This maximization of intellectual capital is in accordance with 
competence-based theory. According to resource dependence theory, intellectual capital is a resource 
of the company as the core of value creation and competitive advantage for companies. Human Capital 
as the employee capabilities is considered as the most important, that can create intangible asset and 
has direct impact on firm performance or valuation. Structural capital also seen as foundation stone in 
the organization can provide supportive environment for employee. Thus, employee can increase 
productivity and decrease total cost of production, and eventually increase companies’ profit23. 
 
8. Conclusion and Suggestion 
From above analysis, it can be concluded that corporate governance in both Indonesia and 
Malaysia positively affect intellectual capital and firm value. The intellectual capital in both countries 
also have a significant and positive impact on firm value. Even more, the intellectual capital in 
Malaysia can partially mediate the relationship between corporate governance and firm value. 
However, the significant impact of both countries are affected by different phenomenon, which is 
reflected in their countries.  
As the importance role of board size, gender diversity and managerial ownership, companies still 
have to consider the amount of board size. They have to ensure that the incremental cost of each 
member of board should be offset with the increment benefit for companies. The companies can 
reference 8-11 members in their board28, 29. Malaysia companies should be more concern on their 
managerial ownership. The data indicated that 31% are on decline effect to firm value & IC. They are 
better to reduce until < 18% or increase > 64%21. Indonesia companies should be more focused to 
improve the recognition of women on their board. Data statistically conclude that women bring 
positive impact to firm value and intellectual capital.  
This study provides not only pragmatism contribution for companies and stakeholders, but also 
incremental and practical contribution for the researchers. However, there are still many opportunities 
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that can be pursued in the future. Future research can add more variables, used different indicators, 
tested on other countries and test on different object. 
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Table 2. Weight Indicator 
 
Country 
Type of Variable Type of Effect 
Explanation 
Hypothesis 
Independent Dependent Mediating Direct Indirect Total Accept/Reject 
Indonesia 
Corporate 
Governance 
VAIC - 
0.121 
(0.065) 
- 
0.121 
(0.065) 
α = 10% H2 is accepted 
Corporate 
Governance 
TBQ VAIC 
0.319 
(<0.001) 
0.030 
(0.298) 
0.349 
(<0.001) 
The model has 
insignificant 
indirect effect 
HI is accepted 
& 
No mediation 
VAIC TBQ - 
0.251 
(<0.001) 
- 
0.251 
(<0.001) 
α = 5% H3 is accepted 
Malaysia 
Corporate 
Governance 
VAIC - 
0.145 
(<0.001) 
- 
0.145 
(<0.001) 
α = 5% H2 is accepted 
Corporate 
Governance 
TBQ VAIC 
0.163 
(<0.001) 
0.087 
(<0.001) 
0.250 
(<0.001) 
The model has 
a positive 
significant 
indirect effect 
HI is accepted 
& 
Partial mediation 
VAIC TBQ - 
0.598 
(<0.001) 
- 
0.598 
(<0.001) 
α = 5% H3 is accepted 
Indicator
Weight 
Indicator
Indicator
Weight 
Indicator
Indicator
Weight 
Indicator
Indicator
Weight 
Indicator
BODsize 0.378 BODsize 0.735 HCE 0.615
BOCsize 0.288 BODmown -0.404 SCE -0.32
BODmown -0.251 BODgender 0.451 CEE 0.646
BOCmown 0.293
BODgender -0.115
BOCgender -0.263
Country
Corporate 
Governance
Intellectual Capital
Malaysia
Country
Corporate 
Governance
Intellectual Capital
Indonesia
HCE 0.653
SCE 0.654
CEE -0,042
